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Sniff and Sear ch Bor der Militar ization
Yessenia Renee Medrano-Vossler∗
I. INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF THE BORDER PATROL UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE 100-MILE BORDER ZONE RULE
While driving on the Tohono O’odham Indian Reservation in Arizona, 50
miles north of the US-Mexico border, Ms. Ernestine Josemaria, a Tohono
O’odham member and US citizen, was stopped by Border Patrol.1 An agent
approached the passenger side of her vehicle and began yelling at Ms.
Josemaria, demanding her identification and reason for speeding, even
though Ms. Josemaria had not been speeding.2 After Ms. Josemaria asked
whether the Tribal Police should be involved, the agent yelled and
demanded that Ms. Josemaria get out of the vehicle.3 After she refused, the
agent accused Ms. Josemaria of being a “known smuggler” and called for
back up.4 Four more agents arrived; one unbuckled her seat belt, and the
agents pulled at her arms and legs until Ms. Josemaria exited the vehicle.5
The agents searched Ms. Josemaria’s truck despite her objections.6 Then,
the agents called for a drug-dog and made Ms. Josemaria wait for
∗

Thank you to the many inspiring, thoughtful, and supportive people who helped me
write and edit this article, especially Becky Fish, James Lyall, Anna Roberts, Steven
Bender, and the 2014–15 and 2015–16 Seattle Journal for Social Justice staff and
editorial board. This article is dedicated to all those affected by and resisting border
militarization. In solidarity!
1
Letter from James Lyall, Staff Att’y, AM. C.L. UNION, to Charles K. Edwards, Deputy
Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 4 (Oct. 9, 2013),
http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/ACLU%20AZ%20Complaint%20re
%20CBP%20Roving%20Patrols%20Oct%209%202013.pdf [hereinafter Letter 1 from
James Lyall].
2
Id. at 5.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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approximately one hour for the drug-dog to arrive.7 Neither the agents nor
the drug-dog found any contraband.8 Ms. Josemaria’s testimony is one of
many stories where the Border Patrol’s use of a drug-dog unlawfully
prolonged an apparent suspicionless stop, violating Ms. Josemaria’s Fourth
Amendment rights.9
The emphasis of often unsympathetic facts in Fourth Amendment cases
that we hear about rather than the unlawful government conduct that led to
the stop or search, often rationalizes the many court decisions chipping
away at the protections under the Fourth Amendment of the US
Constitution.10 In border communities,11 despite sympathetic facts, local law
7
Id. Border Patrol agents use drug-dogs at immigration checkpoints to detect concealed
humans, narcotics, and other contraband. Canine Program, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/canine-program (last
visited Mar. 5, 2016).
8
Letter 1 from James Lyall, supra note 1, at 5.
9
See generally Record of Abuse, AM. C.L. UNION 2–3 (Oct. 2015),
http://www.acluaz.org/Record_of_Abuse (documenting numerous general complaints
against Customs and Border Protection along the Arizona-Mexico border including
several false drug-dog alerts. These complaints do not appear to have resulted in any
disciplinary action against the agency. This report was compiled from information
received through a Freedom of Information Act filed by the ACLU in April 2014)
[hereinafter Record of Abuse].
10
For example, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Florida v. Riley noted that “‘[i]t is a fair
summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in
controversies involving not very nice people,’ and nowhere is this observation more apt
than in the area of the Fourth Amendment, whose words have necessarily been given
meaning largely through decisions suppressing evidence of criminal activity.” Florida v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 463–64 (1989) (Brennan J., dissent) (quoting United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter J., dissent)).
11
In this article, “border communities” refers to the land and people within the Border
Patrol’s jurisdiction as defined by US federal laws and regulations. That is, the 100-mile
border zone along the perimeter of the United States, Puerto Rico, Hawai‘i, and Alaska.
Additionally, when I refer to the border, I am referring to the commonly known
international border lines that were arbitrarily constructed years ago as a way to mark
territorial expansion, designed to exclude indigenous populations and future immigrants.
See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1952) (providing the border patrol with the
authority to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles within a “reasonable distance” of
the border, and private property except for homes within twenty-five miles of the border);
see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (a)(2) (2014) (defining “reasonable distance” of the border as
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enforcement and the US Border Patrol’s (“Border Patrol”) ability to trample
individuals’ (citizens’ and non-citizens’) civil rights with impunity is ever
expanding. 12
In the summer of 2014, I interned in my hometown of Tucson, Arizona,
at a non-profit legal organization focusing on civil rights in the border
region. One of my tasks was conducting intake with individuals whose
rights had been violated by the Border Patrol, local law enforcement, or
both. One of the numerous types of abuses I heard of was prolonged
detention at immigration checkpoints due to the use of drug-dogs.
Individuals I spoke with reported that, similar to Ms. Josemaria’s
experience, when passing through immigration checkpoints or being
stopped by Border Patrol agents, they were not usually asked about their
immigration status (the primary purpose of immigration checkpoints)13 and
instead were detained, searched, and harassed due to alleged drug-dog
“alerts.”
Documentation of drug-dog alerts is limited due to lack of reporting,
from the Border Patrol as well as border residents and travelers. 14
“100 air miles from any external boundary”); The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border
Zone, AM. C.L. UNION, www.aclu.org/constitution-100-mile-border-zone (last visited
Mar. 5, 2016); Record of Abuse, supra note 9.
12
The US Border Patrol is “the mobile, uniformed law enforcement arm of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection within the Department of Homeland Security responsible
for securing U.S. borders[.]”Along U.S. Borders, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders (last visited Mar. 5,
2016).
13
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559–62 (1976).
14
For example, only after filing a FOIA request in 2014 and suing CBP was the ACLU
able to retrieve over one hundred complaints against the Border Patrol that had never
been shared with the public. Additionally, the information received from that FOIA
request is incomplete and only documents two checkpoints in Arizona. “For example,
from Fiscal Year 2012 through Fiscal Year 2013, DHS oversight agencies reported just
three complaints involving alleged Fourth Amendment violations, nationwide. Yet
government records produced to the ACLU reveal that at least 81 such complaints
originated in Tucson and Yuma Sectors alone during the same period (with at least 38
more through just part of FY 2014).” See Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2.
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Nonetheless, suspicionless detention and searches of border travelers and
residents by law enforcement and drug-dogs is common, and often leads to
traumatic and invasive experiences and destruction of property with no
accountability on the part of the Border Patrol.15 Furthermore, search and
seizure standards at or near the border (and in general) are at times unclear,
both to the general public and to the Border Patrol. 16 This means many
individuals are unaware of their rights when traveling through the border
zone, and the Border Patrol is free to perpetuate lawless enforcement
tactics.
The Border Patrol’s primary goal at interior immigration checkpoints has
become narcotics enforcement—a general law enforcement priority outside
of the Border Patrol’s expertise and one explicitly prohibited by the
Supreme Court 17 —rather than immigration enforcement. 18 This priority

15

See Letter from James Lyall, Staff Att’y, AM. C.L. UNION, to Charles K. Edwards,
Deputy Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 4 (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/ACLU%20AZ%20Complaint%20re
%20CBP%20Checkpoints%20%202014%2001%2015.pdf [hereinafter Letter 2 from
James Lyall] (citing twelve incidents where US citizens indicated that they were searched
due to a drug-dog’s false alert and held for varying lengths of time).
16
For example, different immigration stops require different levels of suspicion, and the
evolving Fourth Amendment standards make the law ambiguous and inaccessible to
many border residents and travelers. Additionally, reports indicate that Border Patrol tells
drivers and passengers that the Border Patrol does not need any suspicion to stop or
search a vehicle, which deters individuals from asserting their rights in the face of
unlawful law enforcement conduct. The Border Patrol operates with very little oversight,
and the laws regarding reasonable or unreasonable Border Patrol tactics are constantly
changing among the circuits and subject to agreements with local law enforcement.
17
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000).
18
In discussing the holding in United State v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976),
Circuit Judge Kozinski’s dissent in United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312 (1993), went on
to say that these immigration checkpoints have also yielded a high interdiction of drugs,
pointing to several suppression cases since 1992 stemming from border checkpoints.
While noting that this coincidence may be “an accident,” Judge Kozinski noted that “it
may be much more: There’s reason to suspect the agents working these checkpoints are
looking for more than [undocumented immigrants]. If that is true, it subverts the rationale
of Martinez-Fuerte and turns a legitimate administrative search into a massive violation
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shift has resulted in a rash of civil rights violations around the US border,
including unlawful searches and seizures stemming from misuse of drugdogs and drug-dog error.19 Greater transparency and oversight of the Border
Patrol’s drugs-dogs and reconsideration of the use of drug-dogs in
uncontrolled settings like checkpoints, where their accuracy and reliability
is greatly diminished, is needed.20 Removing drug-dogs from the 100-mile
border zone will help reduce the unchecked civil rights violations by the
Border Patrol.21
A. Drug-Dogs Should Not Be Allowed at Interior Immigration Checkpoints
because they Empower the Border Patrol to Overstep their Lawful Purpose
Available documented border civil rights violations often involve the
Border Patrol’s use of drug-dogs, and their elimination could help to curb
those violations. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has pointed
out that interior immigration checkpoints and Border Patrol operations
allow Border Patrol agents excessive power over border residents and
travelers with little oversight or accountability. 22 Additionally, drug-dogs
can be unreliable due to dog and/or handler error or bias, leads to unlawful
detentions.

23

Lastly, drug-dog searches lead to property damage,

of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir.1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
19
See generally Customs and Border Protection’s 100-Mile Rule, AM. C.L. UNION 2
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/13_08_01_aclu_100_mile_cbp_zone_final.
pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2016) (providing summaries of civil rights violations committed
nationally at both northern and southern borders).
20
See Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2–3.
21
See, e.g., id. at n.50, n.52 (citing support for the inaccuracy of drug-dogs). For
example, when a drug-dog inaccurately alerts, either because of drug-dog error or handler
misconduct, a border patrol agent automatically has probable cause to search the
individual’s vehicle, thus unconstitutionally prolonging the vehicle stop.
22
See generally Letter 2 from James Lyall, supra note 15, at 4 (documenting twelve
instances of unlawful conduct at border checkpoints and requesting immediate review
and investigation by the Department of Homeland Security).
23
Id. at 5–8, 10–11, 13–16.
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intimidation, and traumatizing experiences. 24 Thus, removal of drug-dogs
from interior border checkpoints could limit prolonged seizures and
baseless searches resulting in an overall decrease in abuses at the border.
While ultimately Border Patrol’s authority should be scaled back
drastically, this article focuses on challenging the use of drug-dogs at
immigration checkpoints within the 100-mile border zone as a step towards
decreasing civil rights violations.
B. Limited Civil Rights Based on Proximity to International Borders Should
be a Cause for National Concern and Action
A drug-dog alert in both the local law enforcement and the border
enforcement contexts is sufficient to establish the probable cause needed to
search a vehicle without a warrant or the driver’s consent.25 While internal
immigration checkpoints (immigration checkpoints existing within the
interior of the United States) are lawful for immigration enforcement
purposes,26 in practice, that purpose is often a pretext for the checkpoint’s
secondary focus on drug regulation and general law enforcement—resulting
in frequent civil rights violations.27
US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “one of the world’s largest
law enforcement organizations,”28 includes as a component agency the US
Border Patrol. 29 CBP’s primary and secondary purposes are “terrorist
detection and apprehension” and “detection and seizure of controlled

24

Id. at 10–11.
See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
26
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559–62. (1976).
27
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 31, 47–48 (2000); see also Record of Abuse,
supra note 9, at 11, n. 50, n. 52.
28
About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, http://www.cbp.gov/about (last
visited Feb. 24, 2016).
29
Along U.S. Borders, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, http://www.cbp.gov/bordersecurity/along-us-borders (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
25
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substances,” 30 respectively. While its purposes remain largely undefined, its
secondary purpose delegates wide discretion to the Border Patrol to engage
in general law enforcement power rather than its primary purpose of
immigration enforcement and apprehension.31
Several sets of data illustrate how the Border Patrol has taken advantage
of its general law enforcement power. For example, in the ACLU’s report,
“Record of Abuse,” the ACLU indicates that 2013 CBP arrest statistics
demonstrate that,
Tucson Sector checkpoint apprehensions accounted for only 0.67
percent of the sector’s total apprehensions. In calendar year 2013,
nine out of 23 Tucson sector checkpoints produced zero arrests of
‘deportable subjects.’ The same year, Yuma Sector checkpoint
arrests of U.S. citizens exceeded those of non-citizens by a factor
of nearly eight[.] One checkpoint in Yuma Sector, located 75 miles
from the border, reported only one non-citizen apprehension in
three years, while producing multiple civil rights complaints
during the same period.32
Similarly, apprehension and narcotics seizure data available on CBP’s
website indicates that apprehensions in the Border Sectors 33 dramatically
30

Canine Program, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, http://www.cbp.gov/bordersecurity/along-us-borders/canine-program (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
31
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559–62.
32
Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 3; see also Andrew Becker, Four of Five Border
Patrol Drug Busts Involve U.S. Citizens, Records Show, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE
REPORTING (Mar. 26, 2013), http://cironline.org/reports/four-five-border-patrol-drugbusts-involve-us-citizens-records-show-4312 (emphasis added).
33
“Sector” refers to regions the Border Patrol has divided up for its enforcement
activities. There are twenty sectors nationwide. The Southwest Border Sectors include
nine cities along the southwest—Big Bend (formerly Marfa), Del Rio, El Centro, El Paso,
Laredo, Rio Grande Valley (formerly McAllen), San Diego, Tucson, and Yuma. The
Southwest Border Sectors has consistently been the most staffed region, reporting 18,156
agents in the region in fiscal year 2014, compared to the Northern Border Sectors (Blaine,
Buffalo, Detroit, Grand Forks, Havre, Houlton, Spokane, and Swanton) reporting 2,093
agents, and the Coastal Border Sectors (Miami, New Orleans, and Ramey) reporting 215
agents. While the number has fluctuated drastically over the past decade, the Southwest
Border Sectors has also consistently reported the highest number of apprehensions and
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decreased from fiscal year 2005 (1,089,092 reported apprehensions)
through fiscal year 2011 (340,252 reported apprehensions).34 Meanwhile, in
its 2012 and 2013 “Summar[ies] of Performance and Financial
Information,” CBP reported that the amount of “illegal narcotics seized” has
remained at “2.8 million pounds.”35 This number has shifted (this number is
up 0.1 million pounds from 2010 but down 0.3 from 2011).36 Available data
supports the notion that regardless of migration patterns, the Border Patrol’s
priorities at immigration checkpoints prioritize narcotics regulation.
Below is an overview of the relevant Fourth Amendment law and the
source and authority of the 100-mile border zone rule, sometimes referred

drug seizures. See Sector Profile-Fiscal Year 2014, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL,
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USBP%20Stats%20FY2014%20sector
%20profile.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
34
Southwest Border Sectors: Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions by Fiscal Year, U. S.
BORDER PATROL,
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Fiscal%
20Year%20Apprehension%20Statistics%201960-2013.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2014);
Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions by Month, U. S. BORDER PATROL,
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Total%20Monthly%20Apps%2
0by%20Sector%20and%20Area%2C%20FY2000-FY2014_0.pdf (last visited April 19,
2015) (reporting CBP apprehension statistics from fiscal years 1960 through 2013. In
2006, CBP reported 1,071,972 apprehensions, whereas in 2013, 414,397 were reported
along the Southwest. While apprehensions reportedly began increasing again in 2012, the
increase has been slower, reporting 486,651 total apprehensions across the sectors in
fiscal year 2014).
35
Summary of Performance and Financial Information, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PATROL 2,
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FY2013%20Summary%20of%20Perfor
mance%20and%20Financial%20Information%20%20FINAL%20%28panels%29%20%20%20.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
36
This number “represents narcotics held by [Customs and Border Protection] until
disposal or destruction,” and includes all border checkpoints. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PATROL,
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FY%202013%20Final%20PAR_0.pdf
(last visited Feb. 25, 2016); see also
Summary of Performance and Financial Information, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PATROL, http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/summary_2010_3.pdf (last
visited Feb. 25, 2016).
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to as the “Constitution-Free Zone” due to the culture of impunity.37 This
section provides an overview of different types of immigration checkpoints
and the reasoning and authority behind those checkpoints. The CBP Canine
Program and its purported effectiveness in contributing to border security in
general, an overview of drug-dog related abuses within the 100-mile border
zone as documented by the ACLU’s Border Litigation Project is also
summarized below, and arguments and policies for and against the use of
drug-dogs at interior checkpoints are summarized below. Lastly, this article
proposes ways in which eliminating drug-dogs from interior checkpoints
would help limit Fourth Amendment search and seizure violations in border
communities.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE 100-MILE BORDER ZONE: NOT A
“CONSTITUTION FREE ZONE”
While the federal government and case law have severely limited our
civil rights depending on proximity to the US borders,38 these limitations do
not justify the culture of impunity that the Border Patrol operates under.
This section provides an overview of the Fourth Amendment law and the
100-mile border zone rule, and explanations of how these laws diminish our
civil rights. It also provides a summary of common types of immigration
checkpoints and other interior operations within the 100-mile border zone
including roving patrol stops, and temporary and fixed checkpoints, and
how drug-dogs are used at immigration checkpoints.
37

The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone, AM. C.L. UNION,
www.aclu.org/constitution-100-mile-border-zone (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
38
For example, see U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion
emphasized that the Court’s decision to permit suspicionless immigration checkpoint
stops along the border served to continue the “evisceration of the Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures[,]” and “virtually emptie[d] the
Amendment of its reasonableness requirement[.]” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 567–68 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 408 (2005) (pointing to the lack of privacy right in possessing unlawful substances).
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A. There is No Drug Exception in the Fourth Amendment’s Protection
Against Unlawful Searches and Seizures39
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures. 40 A
seizure incudes even a brief detention or stop by a government official.41 In
assessing the “reasonableness of the seizure,” the court balances “the public
interest [against] the individual’s right to personal security free from
arbitrary interference by law officers.”

42

For example, in City of

Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Supreme Court made it clear that the Fourth
Amendment prohibited against suspicionless checkpoints to interdict
drugs.43 Conversely, the Court has held that the public interest in deterring
unlawful immigration justifies the operation of suspicionless immigration
checkpoints within the 100-mile border zone.44
The Fourth Amendment also protects against unreasonable searches by
requiring a warrant or consent in most cases.45 Courts have maintained that
at a minimum, a search requires consent or probable cause, where
39

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Association, 489 U.S. 602, 641 (1980) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
40
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (citing Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969)).
42
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21).
43
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 31, 47–48 (2000).
44
See generally United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559–60 (1976)
(describing why suspicionless routing immigration checkpoints are less intrusive to the
public than roving patrol stops); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878–80 (clarifying that the
reasonableness of Fourth Amendment seizures is measured by the “balance between the
public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law enforcement”); United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 431
(5th Cir. 2001) (stating that “checkpoints with the primary purpose of identifying
[undocumented] immigrants are constitutional, and checkpoints with the primary purpose
of interdicting illegal drugs are not”).
45
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973).
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“reasonably trustworthy” facts and circumstances known to law
enforcement are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that “an
offense has been or is being committed.” 46 Furthermore, suspiconless
Border Patrol checkpoint stops in the 100-mile border zone are not
supposed to permit free range to law enforcement to conduct searches; at
minimum, probable cause must exist for an interior search. 47 Thus, while
the Border Patrol can set up checkpoints to stop drivers in the border region
without any level of suspicion, the scope of inquiry is limited to brief
questioning for immigration purposes absent suspicion. 48 Border Patrol
agents often exceed this scope.
B. The 100-mile Border Zone Rule Grants too Much Authority to the Border
Patrol and Stems from Outdated Regulations
The boundaries of the 100-mile border zone derive from 8 U.S.C. §1357
(powers of immigration officers and employees). 49 8 U.S.C. §1357 was
adopted by the US Department of Justice in 1953, during a time when less
than 1,100 Border Patrol agents patrolled our borders.50 In 1957, the US
Government defined 8 U.S.C. §1357(a)(3)’s “reasonable distance”
language as “100 air miles from any external boundary of the United
States.”51 In his majority opinion in Alameida-Sanchez v. United States in
1973, Justice Stewart pointed out that no justification for such a broad
search power exists other than the “reasonable distance” language of the
46

See Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States 267
U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
47
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 269 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153
(1925).
48
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 31, 47–48 (2000); Machuca-Barrera, 261
F.3d at 431 (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41).
49
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 268 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2006)).
50
8 U.S.C.A. § 1357 (1952); The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone AM. C.L.
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/constitution-100-mile-border-zone (last
visited Mar. 16, 2016).
51
8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (a)(2) (2014) (emphasis added).
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statute.52 Revisiting the scope of this statute is a necessity now more than
ever because today, over 21,000 Border Patrol agents patrol our borders
nationwide,

53

and

two-thirds

of

the

United

State’s

population

(approximately 200 million people) reside within the Border Patrol’s 100mile jurisdiction. 54 Despite the dramatic increase in militarization of the
border, the 100-mile border zone regulation has remained static, while case
law and US policy continue to expand the authority of the Border Patrol and
limit civil rights within border communities.55
C. Know Your Rights: An Overview of Lawful Searches and Seizures within
the 100-Mile Border Zone
While all persons entering the United States, including US citizens, are
subject to examination and search by CBP officers, this article focuses on
checkpoints existing within the 100-mile border zone, not including
international ports of entry. 56 However, the authority permitting routine
border searches at international borders extends to temporary or fixed
immigration checkpoints within the interior of the United States.57
This section explains the legal basis for the following Border Patrol
operations—checkpoints, temporary checkpoints, roving patrol stops—and
the laws around drug-dogs at checkpoints. This section concludes by
providing additional examples of how courts have functioned to erase the
restrictions on operating checkpoints for general law enforcement purposes.

52

Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S., 413 at 268 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2006)) (emphasis
added).
53
The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone, AM. C.L. UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/constitution-100-mile-border-zone (last visited
Mar. 16, 2016).
54
Id.
55
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1952) & 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (a)(2) (2014).
56
8 U.S.C. §1357(c) (1952).
57
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272–73.
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1. Per manent/Tempor ar y Inter nal Immigr ation Checkpoints
Permanent and temporary internal immigration checkpoints are structures
along roadways within the 100-mile border zone. 58 These checkpoints
derive their authority from the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte,59 which held that routine “stops for brief questioning” at
immigration checkpoints are justified under the Fourth Amendment,
regardless of individualized suspicion. 60 The Court in Martinez-Fuerte
noted that “one’s expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in
its operation are significantly different from the traditional expectation of
privacy and freedom in one’s residence.”61 The Ninth Circuit has upheld the
use of temporary checkpoints because of (1) the checkpoint’s primary
purpose of immigration enforcement; (2) the lack of officer discretion in the
placement and operation of the checkpoint; (3) the “checkpoint’s visibility,
appearance, and the presence of numerous [officers] in uniform;” and (4)
the minimal intrusion of the stop.62
Some permanent and temporary checkpoints also have the capacity to
refer vehicles to secondary inspection and Border Patrol agents may do so
58
While sometimes referred to the “functional equivalent” of international border
checkpoints, this title is misleading because there are distinct legal differences between
the two types of checkpoints, including the fact that individual rights are less restricted at
internal permanent checkpoints. For example, at international border checkpoints,
customs officials are authorized to conduct warrantless searches of individuals if the
official has reasonable cause to suspect the individual should not be admitted into the
United States, whereas Border Patrol agents are required to obtain consent or probable
cause to justify detention exceeding the routine questioning at permanent and temporary
interior immigration checkpoints. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c)(2012); see also United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566–67 (1976).
59
428 U.S. 543 (1976).
60
Id. at 566. The Court reasoned that the stops were less invasive than roving patrol
seizures (discussed below), the impact on traffic was minimal (for example, due to the
location and structure of the checkpoint, motorists are less likely to be taken by surprise),
and the operation of the checkpoints “involve less discretionary enforcement activity”
decreasing the potential for abuse by inspecting officers. Id. at 559.
61
Id. at 561.
62
United States v. Hernandez, 739 F.2d 484, 487 (9th Cir.1984).
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based on “less than reasonable suspicion.” 63 According to the Court in
Martinez-Fuerte, referral to secondary inspection is justified even if “made
largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry[.]” 64 Similar to the
justification behind permanent or temporary checkpoints, the Court
reasoned that referral to secondary inspection was not overly stigmatizing
or intrusive, as alleged by the defendant, if the sole purpose was consistent
with conducting brief questioning regarding immigration status.65 Consent
or probable cause is required in order to justify any detention beyond the
routine immigration stop or search.66
According to the ACLU, the last time the Border Patrol disclosed
immigration checkpoint information was in fiscal year 2008, where they
reported operating 128 checkpoints nationwide. 67 That number has likely
increased, as The Arizona Republic reported that CBP operated
approximately 170 checkpoints nationwide in February 2014.68 While CBP
has reportedly refused to specify the location and number of operating
immigration checkpoints, based on research conducted by The Arizona
Republic, the Border Patrol likely has the ability to operate up to 200
checkpoints.69

63

Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563.
See id. at 563–67 (stating that “even if it be assumed that [secondary] referrals are
made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, [the Court] perceive[d] no
constitutional violation”).
65
Id. at 560.
66
Id. at 567.
67
U.S. BORDER PATROL INTERIOR CHECKPOINTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS,
AM. C.L. UNION BORDER LITIGATION PROJECT 1 (Nov. 2014),
https://www.aclusandiego.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Border-Patrol-CheckpointFAQs.pdf.
68
Bob Ortega, Some in Town to Monitor Border Patrol Checkpoint, AZ CENT. (Feb. 26,
2014),
http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20140225arizona-town-monitor-borderpatrol-checkpoint.html.
69
Id.
64

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Sniff and Search Border Militarization 929

2. Roving Patr ol Stops
Unlike temporary or permanent immigration checkpoints that allow stops
of motorists without any level of suspicion, Border Patrol agents must have
at least reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains individuals who
could potentially be in the United States without lawful status in order to
conduct a roving patrol stop. 70 Furthermore, absent consent or probable
cause, the scope of the roving patrol stop must be limited to inquiry about
the citizenship and immigration status of the driver and passengers, and to
an explanation of “suspicious circumstances”; 71 no suspiconless search is
permitted.
3. The Function of Dr ug-Dogs at Immigr ation Checkpoints
Drug-dogs are permitted at stops lawful at their inception as long as their
use does not extend the stop beyond its permitted scope or absent additional
suspicion. 72 In a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, the court
70

In Terry v. Ohio, a reasonable suspicion was formed if the officer could “‘point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant’ a belief that his safety or that of others is in danger.” Similar to
a Terry stop, the roving patrol “stop and inquiry must be ‘reasonably related in scope’”
to the Border Patrol’s original reason for the stop. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 880–82 (1975) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). The Court
articulated the following factors to support a stop based on reasonable suspicion: “(1)
characteristics of the area in which [Border Patrol agents] encountered the vehicle; (2) its
proximity to the border; (3) the usual patterns of traffic on the particular road; (4)
previous experience with alien traffic; (5) information about recent illegal border
crossings in the area; (6) the driver’s behavior; (7) aspects of the vehicle itself; and (8)
the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as
the mode of dress and haircut.” Id. at 885. However, in United States v. MonteroCamargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit held generally that
“Hispanic appearance” is not an “appropriate factor.”
71
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881–82.
72
See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015) (holding that a traffic
stop prolonged for seven to eight minutes to allow a drug-dog to walk around the vehicle
was unconstitutional); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); see also
United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2001). The court in that case
clarified that “while a drug-dog sniff is not a search, it is beyond the justifying scope of
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vacated a conviction due to the invalidity of a drug-dog search and
remanded to the district court to determine whether the “prosecutors [could]
establish the reliability of the trained canine[.]”73 In that case, the defendant
alleged that the agent misguided the dog.74 Poorly trained handlers can also
be the source of drug-dog inaccuracies.75
Nevertheless, seizures extended “beyond the time reasonably required to
complete” the original stop76 are not uncommon in border regions. In some
instances, like that of Ms. Josemaria’s,77 the act of retrieving the drug-dog
to conduct the routine sniff (the process of walking the dog around the
vehicle) is not supported by the requisite suspicion, or the drug-dog “alert”
itself is tainted. 78 Drug-dogs are used at Border Patrol checkpoints and
during roving patrol stops, and often unlawfully prolong the detentions, and
justify the conditions for Border Patrol agents to conduct an unlawful
search. 79 In the process, liberty, privacy, and property rights of individuals’
subject to these searches are violated.
an immigration stop. Thus, Border Patrol agents may only conduct a drug-dog sniff if it
does not lengthen the stop or if they obtain consent.” Id. at 432 n.21.
73
Court Vacates Arizona Conviction for Invalid Search, AZ CENT. (Aug. 8, 2013),
http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/free/20130808arizona-invalid-dog-search-caseruling.html?odyssey=obinsite.
74
Id.
75
Mark Derr, With Dog Detectives, Mistakes Can Happen, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/24/science/with-dog-detectives-mistakes-canhappen.html.
76
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124
(1984)).
77
Letter 1 from James Lyall, supra note 1, at 4.
78
These scenarios are not unheard of among communities militarized by law
enforcement. For example, in Jay-Z’s rap single 99 Problems, released while Caballes,
was pending before the Supreme Court, Jay-Z describes a scenario in which he is racially
profiled and pulled over by a police officer, and after Jay-Z declines to provide consent
for a search of his vehicle, the officer responds, “We’ll see how smart you are when the
[canine] come.” JAY-Z, 99 PROBLEMS (Roc-A-Fella Records, 2003).
79
See generally Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2–3; Letter 2 from James Lyall, supra
note 15, at 4–11 (describing several search and seizure incidents at an immigration
checkpoint without any inquiry into the individual’s citizenship status).
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III. HOW UNCHECKED DRUG-DOG ALERTS CONTRIBUTE TO CIVIL
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE 100-MILE BORDER ZONE
This section provides a brief overview of CBP’s Canine Program, the
standards that drug-dogs are held to at immigration checkpoints, and the
effect on the community. It also provides documented incidents, like that of
Ms. Josemaria, where drug-dog use further violated individual civil rights at
immigration checkpoints.
A. An Overview of the Customs and Border Protection Canine Program
The CBP Canine Program was established in October 2009.80 The Canine
Program shares the same broad and ambiguous goals as CBP: “terrorist
detection and apprehension” and “detection and seizure of controlled
substances and other contraband.” 81 Additionally, with over 1,500 canine
teams, the CBP Canine Program (Canine Program) is the largest drug-dog
enforcement unit in the nation.82 The Canine Program trains dogs to identify
drugs and people, 83 and includes programs and training courses such as,
“Concealed Human and Narcotic Detection,” “Search and Rescue,”
“Tracking/Trailing,” “Special Response,” “Canine Currency/Firearms
Detection,” and “Human Remains Detection/Cadaver.” 84 Only limited
information exists online about the details of the Canine Program.

80

Canine Program History, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION,
http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/canine-program/history-3 (last
visited June 5, 2016).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Fernanda Echevaria, The Sniff Patrol: Border Patrol Dogs Find Drugs, Humans,
TUCSON CITIZEN (Aug. 11, 2008),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:cj_ywM9fGE0J:tucsoncitizen.co
m/morgue/2008/08/11/93299-the-sniff-patrol-border-patrol-dogs-find-drugshumans/+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a.
84
Id.
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B. The Deference to Drug-Dogs Supports the Culture of Impunity
Surrounding the Border Patrol
Courts generally regard drug-dogs as sufficient indicators of contraband
and rarely question their reliability, which in effect grants more power to
handlers, in this case Border Patrol agents. The Ninth Circuit has held that
once an individual has cleared the initial immigration inspection at a
checkpoint, an agent cannot extend the length of the detention beyond the
immigration scope to complete a drug-dog sniff absent a showing of
“articulable suspicion or a minimal showing of suspicion.” 85 In other
circuits, courts minimize the need for drug-dog accuracy in search and
seizure procedures, which in turn may lead to extended stops that may or
may not be based on suspicion. For example, the Fifth Circuit confusingly
held that “a showing of a dog’s reliability is not required if probable cause
is developed on site as a result of a dog sniff of a vehicle,” perpetuating the
reasoning that the fruits of the search outweigh the legality of the
procedure.86 Similarly, other circuits have adopted the sweeping idea that a
drug-dog handler’s testimony under oath regarding the dog’s training and
certification is sufficient to verify the drug-dog’s reliability.87 In the Sixth
Circuit, “production of a dog’s performance and training records is not

85

United States v. Preciado-Robles, 964 F.2d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United
States v. Taylor, 934 F.2d 218, 221 (9th Cir.1991)) (finding that the government’s
showing that the driver became increasingly nervous during questioning was sufficient to
establish the requisite suspicion).
86
United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995).
87
See United States v. Stevenson, 274 F. Supp. 2d 819, 819 (S.D. Tex. 2002); see, e.g.,
United States v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding dog’s reliability
established by affidavit only stating dog’s training and certification to detect contraband;
detailed accounting of dog’s track record and education not required); see also United
States v. Outlaw, 134 F.Supp.2d 807, 814 (W.D. Tex. 2001); United States v. Diaz, 25
F.3d 392, 395–96 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that the dog’s training and reliability were
established by the district court’s determination of the handler’s credible testimony as to
the dog’s training, certification, and experience. “This court has indicated that testimony
is sufficient to establish a dog’s reliability in order to support a valid sniff.”).
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necessary to establish a dog’s training and reliability.” 88 The reliance on
drug-dog capabilities and far-reaching extension of power to drug-dog
handlers fosters the barriers to challenging civil rights violations and
immunizes the actions of the Border Patrol.
C. Documented Instances Drug-Dogs Causing or Contributing to Civil
Rights Violations Within the 100-Mile Border Zone
The geographic area and communities subject to suspicionless stops and
questioning by Border Patrol, and the discretion afforded to Border Patrol
agents, creates greater potential for abuse. The ACLU gathered the
following examples of unlawful searches and seizures at various
immigration checkpoints where drug-dogs were involved along the
southwest border: (1) drug-dogs were used to extend searches despite the
lack of reasonable suspicion required in roving patrol stops; (2) drug-dogs
were used at immigration checkpoints to extend searches purely for
possession of drugs; and (3) drug-dogs were used at immigration
checkpoints to prolong searches beyond the limited scope of immigration
questioning.89
Border Patrol has used drug-dogs to unlawfully extend roving patrol
stops despite the lack of reasonable suspicion required to justify the seizure
in the first place. For example, on October 9, 2013, the ACLU filed an
administrative complaint with the Department of Homeland Security
requesting investigation of various unlawful roving patrol stops by Border
Patrol conducted in southern Arizona.90 In one incident, Bryan Barrow, a
US citizen and resident of Oregon, was returning from a hike when he
found a park ranger peering into his vehicle. 91 Even though Mr. Barrow

88
89
90
91

Stevenson, 274 F.Supp.2d at 822.
Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2.
See Letter 1 from James Lyall, supra note 1, at 1.
Id. at 6.
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cooperated with the ranger, the ranger interrogated Mr. Barrow regarding
whether there was marijuana in the vehicle and called in additional rangers
for assistance.92 Eventually, a Border Patrol agent with a drug-dog arrived
and began inspecting the vehicle. 93 Mr. Barrow was never asked for
permission to search his vehicle, and he objected to the search.94 The dog
never visibly alerted to the vehicle, but the agent alleged that the drug-dog
was “set off,” thus permitting the agent to initiate the search. 95 The dog
caused significant damage to Mr. Barrow’s vehicle, totaling close to $700
worth of damage; however, when Mr. Barrow’s insurance company
submitted for reimbursement, the Border Patrol denied the claim.96 With the
dog search, the total detention lasted approximately four hours, and the
Border Patrol found no drugs.97 This case demonstrates an instance where
the Border Patrol used a drug-dog to conduct general law enforcement
duties beyond the scope of the Border Patrol: there was no inquiry or
suspicion related to Mr. Barrow’s immigration status and thus no need to
contact the Border Patrol, and no drug-dog “alert” was observed by Mr.
Barrow. The Department of Homeland Security has failed to investigate
these complaints.98
In a second administrative complaint against the Department of
Homeland Security on January 15, 2014, the ACLU sought investigation
into abuses at interior immigration checkpoints by Border Patrol.99 In that
complaint, nine out of the twelve documented incidents involved drug-dogs,

92

Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
E-mail from James Lyall, Staff Attorney, ACLU of Arizona, to Yessenia Medrano
(Mar. 24, 2015) (on file with author).
99
Letter 1 from James Lyall, supra note 1.
93
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and in eight of the nine incidents, the drug-dog either falsely alerted or the
Border Patrol agent appeared to direct the drug-dog to alert.100
In some incidents listed in the January 2014 complaint, Border Patrol
agents used dogs to prolong detention or to conduct searches for evidence
of criminal law violations without ever inquiring into individuals’
citizenship or immigration status. During a December 18, 2013, incident at
the well-known Arivaca temporary checkpoint in Amado, Arizona,
occupants in a vehicle passing through the checkpoint were referred to
secondary inspection for no apparent reason. 101 A Border Patrol agent
unlawfully prolonged their detention by making them wait until a drug-dog
arrived to conduct a search because the occupants declined to consent to a
search. 102 The individuals were detained for 30 minutes, and they were
never asked about their citizenship status.103
In another incident, a family was passing through an immigration
checkpoint east of the Tohono O’odham Reservation in Arizona on August
19, 2013.104 The family was immediately directed to secondary inspection
without any questions regarding citizenship or any other explanation
besides an alleged drug-dog alert. 105 However, no drug-dog was nearby
when the agent claimed that there was an “alert.”106
One woman reported two incidents were she was detained due to false
drug-dog alerts while passing through the same checkpoint in Tombstone,
Arizona, that led to no findings of contraband. 107 First, on November 8,
2012, she was detained for 45 minutes due to an alleged drug-dog “alert.”108
100

Id. at 9–11 (emphasis added).
Id. at 4–5.
102
Id. at 4–5.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 8.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 10.
108
Id. at 10.
101
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Then, on January 1, 2013, she was referred to secondary inspection after an
agent walked a drug-dog around her vehicle, tapped on the trunk of her
vehicle, and said there was a “hit.” 109 The woman’s father is a retired
sheriff’s deputy who has extensive experience with police dogs and stated
that he had witnessed improper handling of the dogs at that checkpoint, and
suspects his daughter was racially profiled due to her possible “Latina”
appearance.110
Lastly, one man was referred to secondary inspection on three different
occasions at checkpoints in Arizona due to alleged dog “alerts.”111 On the
first occasion, on December 21, 2012, he was directed to a secondary
inspection based on alleged drug-dog “alert,” and the dog was allowed to
search the inside of his vehicle despite his objections, destroying some
business papers in the process.

112

On the second occasion on

December 28, 2012, he was directed to secondary inspection due to an
alleged drug-dog “alert,” and he was detained for ten minutes. 113 On the
third occasion on October 24, 2012, he was directed to secondary inspection
due to a drug-dog “alert,” and while in secondary inspection, the agent
continued to command the dog to “hit” but nothing was found. 114 These
instances demonstrate the power of inaccurate “alerts” to infringe on
individuals’ persons, property, and privacy, as well as abuse of authority by
Border Patrol agents through the use of drug-dogs.
Furthermore, in some cases, drug-dogs were used to prolong a search
even though the agents had completed their immigration search, and no
apparent additional requisite suspicion existed. In an incident on December
2, 2013, involving the Arivaca checkpoint, an individual was referred to
109

Id. at 10.
Id. at 10 n.20.
111
Id. at 10–11.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
110
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secondary inspection after the Border Patrol agent had verified his
citizenship status. 115 At secondary inspection, the Border Patrol agent
directed the individual to exit the vehicle and directed a drug-dog inside the
vehicle.116 When the driver of the vehicle objected to the search, the agent
cursed at him; the individual was detained for 30 minutes.117
In another incident on November 29, 2013, at a checkpoint between
California and Arizona, after confirming their US Citizenship, two
individuals were referred to secondary inspection where they were again
asked about their citizenship status.118 The individuals were asked to exit
the vehicle for no apparent reason, and an agent arrived with a drug-dog and
circled the vehicle. 119 Despite the fact that the drug-dog alerted to the
vehicle next door, the agent said the dog hit their car and Border Patrol
needed to conduct a search of the vehicle.120 When the individuals objected,
they were taken to holding cells where they were detained for 45 minutes
before being released. 121 Department of Homeland Security has not
responded to this complaint filed in January 2014.122

IV. ABUSES AT IMMIGRATION CHECKPOINTS AND OUTDATED 100MILE BORDER ZONE JURISPRUDENCE CALLS FOR THE ELIMINATION
OF DRUG-DOGS AT IMMIGRATION CHECKPOINTS
Courts, policy makers, and citizens continue to allow an increased
deference to the Border Patrol in the interest of national security.123 CBP
115

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 8.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
E-mail from James Lyall, supra note 98.
123
See generally U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, VISION AND STRATEGY 2020
(2015), http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP-Vision-Strategy-2020.pdf
(emphasizing the range of work and tactics of CBP to protect national security).
116

VOLUME 14 • ISSUE 3 • 2016

938 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

and the Canine Program’s broad and ambiguous goal of “terrorist detection
and apprehension” provide the Border Patrol with little guidance and
accountability.124 However, the cost of securing our borders is not without
civil rights violations. Even if a drug-dog alert is sufficient to establish
probable cause to search, it does not justify the fact that the liberty of many
border residents and travelers is rendered nonexistent when they are
detained for lengthy periods as a result of a false drug-dog alert. In some
documented roving patrol cases discussed earlier, the requisite reasonable
suspicion justifying the initial stop conducted by the Border Patrol is
lacking, making the subsequent drug-dog “alert” and search, whether based
on probable cause or not, unlawful. 125 In other roving patrol instances,
detentions are unjustly prolonged beyond the permissible scope because
individuals are forced to wait for a drug-dog to arrive to conduct a search.126
As discussed, cases have been documented where the Border Patrol has
used drug-dogs to allege “alerts” that end up being false.127 Additionally,
false alerts can “result from conscious and unconscious signals from the
handler, essentially causing the canine to suspect contraband.”128 An agent
is unable to determine whether the dog is alerting to drugs or humans, thus
making it easier for Border Patrol to veil their primary narcotics interdiction
124

Canine Program History, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION,
http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/canine-program/history-3 (last
visited June 5, 2016).
125
Letter 1 from James Lyall, supra note 1, at 6.
126
See Id. at 6–10.
127
See Jorge G. Aristotelidis, Trained Canines at the U.S.-Mexico Border Region: A
Review of Current Fifth Circuit Law and a Call for Change, 5 SCHOLAR 227, 239 (2003);
see also Know Your Rights with Border Patrol, AM. C.L. UNION,
http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/ACLU%20Border%20Rights%20EN
GLISH.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
128
See Aristotelidis, supra note 127, at 239; see also Know Your Rights with Border
Patrol, AM. C.L. UNION,
http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/ACLU%20Border%20Rights%20EN
GLISH.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2014); see also Lisa Lit et al., Handler Beliefs Affect
Scent Detection Dog Outcomes, 14 ANIMAL COGNITION, 387, 387–394 (2011).
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priority, because a drug-dog only has one physical “alert.” 129 Due to the
potential for false drug-dog alerts and ability of handlers to abuse their
power and manipulate an “alert,” a drug-dog “alert” should not be sufficient
to establish probable cause to search.
A. Arguments For and Against the Canine Program
The political and social climate in the United States, as well as the
continued “War on Drugs” and “War on Terror,” may provide policy
makers and courts with sufficient support for the Canine Program. 130
Detection and seizure of controlled substances and other contraband131 is a
goal of the program, and based on available data, the program has been
successful in interdicting unlawful narcotics in the US. For example,
from April 2006 through June 2007, US Customs and Border
Protection had procured 322 untrained canines . . . while only
3.85% of the Office of Border Patrol’s 13,905 agents were canine
handlers, they were credited with 60% of narcotic apprehensions
and 40% of all other apprehensions in [fiscal year] 2007.132
More recently, in fiscal year 2013, “CBP Canine Teams were responsible
for apprehending 55,604 [undocumented immigrants], and seizing 403,478
pounds of narcotics.”133

129

Motion to Reconsider Court’s Tentative Ruling Upholding Stop and Referral to
Secondary Inspection without Reasonable Suspicion, State of Arizona v. David Frederick
Wakeling, No. S1400CR2007-00316, (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Apr. 8, 2008), at 5,
http://www.k9consultantsofamerica.com/training_information/yuma1.pdf.
130
Jim Giermanski, DHS, Drug Interdiction and Common Sense, CSO ONLINE (Apr. 3,
2009), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2123915/compliance/dhs--druginterdiction-andcommon-sense.html.
131
Id.
132
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., A REVIEW OF U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION’S PROCUREMENT OF UNTRAINED CANINES 1 (Apr. 2008),
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_08-46_Apr08.pdf.
133
While not specific, this statistic likely includes canines at all immigrant checkpoints.
Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2013, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
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However, aside from CBP’s ever-increasing budget and the cost
associated with running the Canine Program,134 communities appear to be
pushing away from the War on Drugs through legislative reforms.135 For
example, 18 states have passed forms of legislation decriminalizing
marijuana,136 the primary drug seized at border checkpoints.137 If marijuana
use continues to be decriminalized, this could further decrease the narcotics
smuggling in the southern border region and lessen the need for drug-dogs
under the national security rationale. Additionally, the fact that drug-dogs
only have one “alert” 138 is relevant to whether marijuana use is legal
because drug-dogs cannot distinguish between the type of drug an
individual is carrying, thus increasing the potential for drug-dog error. To
address this issue, some local police departments have removed drug-dogs
from their police work to eliminate the possibility of conducting an illegal
search.139 Furthermore, because the Border Patrol does not publicly disclose
its statistics on individual checkpoints, the amount and types of narcotics
seized at various checkpoints are unknown to the public, even though that

PROTECTION 19 (2013),
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FY%202013%20Final%20PAR_0.pdf.
134
Motion to Reconsider, supra note 129, at 5.
135
State Marijuana Laws Map, GOVERNING,
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html
(last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
136
Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See NORML, http://norml.org/states (last
visited Mar. 22, 2015).
137
SECTOR PROFILE-FISCAL YEAR 2014, U.S. BORDER PATROL (2014),
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USBP%20Stats%20FY2014%20sector
%20profile.pdf.
138
Motion to Reconsider, supra note 129, at 5.
139
Everton Bailey Jr., Marijuana Sniffing Dogs on Way, OREGON LIVE (Jan. 31, 2015),
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2015/01/marijuanasniffing_dogs_on_way.html.

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Sniff and Search Border Militarization 941

information could assist in determining which temporary and permanent
checkpoints are actually “necessary.”140
Moreover, the statute governing the 100-mile border zone rule and the
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence granting wide search and seizure
discretion to the Border Patrol are outdated. As the ACLU points out, the
statute authorizing Border Patrol to conduct immigration checkpoints
throughout border communities was enacted at a time when there were only
1,000 Border Patrol agents; 21,000 agents patrol our borders today. 141
Fourth Amendment precedent is often focused on the act committed rather
than the private and public interests at stake and fails to take into account
the impact that those decisions will have on the general public as a result.
Allowing Border Patrol agents to use drug-dogs to initiate and conduct
searches and seizures is a grant of additional law enforcement power that
the Border Patrol is unequipped and untrained to take on, in part because of
the unreliability of drug-dogs. For example, in Mr. Barrow’s incident
documented in the October 23, 2013, ACLU administrative complaint, park
rangers alerted Border Patrol to a situation where no immigration inquiry
(or criminal) was apparently at issue.

142

This is just one example

demonstrating the increasing reliance on Border Patrol to execute general
law enforcement tasks that are outside of their primary function.
Courts have emphasized that drug-dogs are more likely to be reliable due
to training, and the sniff does not implicate the privacy concerns involved in
a search.143 Some have argued that dogs are better at identifying a particular
140

See Ted Robbins, In Arizona, Citizens Keep Close Eye on Immigration Checkpoint,
NPR (Mar. 29, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/03/29/296297733/in-arizona-citizenskeep-close-eye-on-immigration-checkpoint.
141
Know Your Rights: The Government’s 100-Mile “Border Zone,” AM. C.L. UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights-governments-100-mile-border-zone-map
(last
visited Mar. 5, 2016).
142
Letter 1 from James Lyall, supra note 1, at 6–7.
143
See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); see also United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (stating that a “sniff discloses only the presence or absence of
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odor than current technology.144 Some might also argue that, while drugs
may be inaccurate at times, they do not possess the same biases humans or
their handlers do.145
However, dogs falsely alert due to individual error. For example, in an
article from 2008, the coordinator for the K-9 unit in the Tucson, Arizona,
Border Patrol sector said that, “checkpoints are the most difficult
environment for dogs to work in because of the distractions.”146 At one of
the busiest checkpoints where at least one dog is on duty all day, “there’s
wind, distracting odors, agents working around them, other dogs and, of
course, the 1,500 vehicles that drive by every hour[.]” 147 Additionally,
working in dry and hot climates such as the Southwest can dry out the
mucus in the dog’s nose, thus interfering with their accuracy rate.148 Dogs
enjoy being rewarded and may provide false alerts for the rewards.149 The
Border Patrol has data indicating false alerts by drug-dogs.150
Additionally, while Illinois v. Caballes held that a drug-dog sniff at a
stop was acceptable as long as the sniff was within the scope of the stop, it
narcotics . . . the information obtained is limited,” which “also ensures that the owner of
the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less
discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods”).
144
Mark Derr, With Dog Detectives, Mistakes Can Happen, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/24/science/with-dog-detectives-mistakes-canhappen.html.
145
See U.S. v. Stevenson, 274 F.Supp.2d 824 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (stating that “the use of
canine inspections cannot be underestimated in today’s diverse society, when all of usand particularly those involved in law enforcement-are concerned about ethnic profiling .
. . canines provide a means of crime detection that is neutral as to race, ethnicity, gender,
age, nationality and other sensitive variables”).
146
Fernanda Echavarri, Sniff Patrol: Border Patrol Dogs Find Drugs, Humans, TUCSON
CITIZEN (Aug. 11, 2008),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:cj_ywM9fGE0J:tucsoncitizen.co
m/morgue/2008/08/11/93299-the-sniff-patrol-border-patrol-dogs-find-drugshumans/+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a.
147
Id.
148
Derr, supra note 144.
149
Id.
150
Echavarri, supra note 146.
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is unclear where the scope of the stop ends or whether a dog is
unreasonably prolonging the stop due to the lack of finality from the courts
or regulations defining “reasonable time.”151 Along those lines, allowing a
dog to search too long in one area may increase errors. 152 While mixed
research exists on whether drug-dogs carry biases towards race or ethnicity,
their handlers who are ultimately in control may carry those biases.153 Also,
the fact that courts tend to defer to the drug-dog’s handler to assess
“reliability” of a drug-dog alert further serves to blur the lines of individual
rights and protections.154 Thus, keeping a dog stationed in an area or with a
handler who tends to be more suspicious of people who appear to be
Latinx155 may pass that bias on to the dogs.
Questioning the Border Patrol agents’ actions, filing complaints with
Border Patrol, and pursuing legal remedies are costly and inaccessible. For
example, while researching the CBP complaint process, I submitted a
standard test complaint on November 21, 2014, online with the US CBP
Information Center.156 I did not hear back until June 8, 2015, when I was
sent the following response:
Your question was forwarded to the complaints team on
June 05, 2015 for review. We regret the delay in receiving your
email from the “Ask a Question” queue. Due to the length of time

151
Mike Riggs, How Long Can a Cop Keep You After a Traffic Stop? No One’s Sure,
CITYLAB (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/commute/2014/02/how-long-can-copkeep-you-pulled-over-after-traffic-stop-no-ones-sure/8293/.
152
Derr, supra note 144.
153
See generally Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2; see also Lisa Lit et al., supra note
128, at 387–94.
154
Jorge G. Aristotelidis, Trained Canines at the U.S. – Mexico Border Region: A Review
of Current Fifth Circuit Law and a Call for Change, 5 THE SCHOLAR 236 (2003).
155
The “x” represents gender neutrality and includes individuals who do not identify
within the gender binary.
156
E-mail from Officer Balero, CBP INFO Center, to Yessenia Medrano (June 8, 2015)
(on file with the author).
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it has been since you emailed; we are unsure if you still require a
response. However, if you do, please write us back.157
In my experience speaking with border residents in the Southwest and
Washington State, aggressive actions by Border Patrol agents have deterred
individuals from questioning the Border Patrol agents’ actions and motives,
thus instilling a culture of fear among border residents and travelers. Some
data, if documented, such as the amount of drugs interdicted or
apprehensions at each specific checkpoint, may be available through
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and lawsuits. However, those
methods usually take time, may be costly, and are inaccessible due to other
barriers.158 Moreover, even if FOIA requests were filed, no guarantee exists
that all of the information would be provided due to the lack of reporting
conducted by CBP and the interest of the government to redact certain
information.159
However, in Arivaca, Arizona, where a temporary immigration
checkpoint has been operating for seven years on a road that does not lead
to the border,160 the community has taken monitoring of the checkpoint into
their own hands and has documented unlawful detentions and racial
discrimination, among other data.

161

With the demonstrated lack of

accountability and culture of impunity, there is little incentive to file
complaints online due to fear of immigration enforcement, among other
consequences.162
157

Id.
Such as, lack of access to resources and lack of knowledge of individual rights within
the border zone.
159
See generally Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 4, 11. CBP refused to turn over all info
and most of it was redacted.
160
Ted Robbins, In Arizona, Citizens Keep Close Eye on Immigration Checkpoint, NPR
(Mar. 29, 2014, 4:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/03/29/296297733/in-arizonacitizens-keep-close-eye-on-immigration-checkpoint.
161
Id.
162
Daniel E. Martínez et al., No Action Taken: Lack of CBP Accountability in
Responding to Complaints of Abuse, AM. IMMIGR. COUNS. (May 4, 2014),
158
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Furthermore, there are limited free or low-cost legal services in many
border communities,163 thus legal services organizations must be strategic in
the battles they choose to pursue. A canine search of a vehicle can cause
property damage and be a completely traumatizing experience, especially to
particularly vulnerable populations such as small children, people with
disabilities, and people with allergies. 164 Yet, the damages available may
not be worth the trouble of filing a legal complaint. 165 Government
resources should be allotted to helping border residents pursue those
monetary damages even if they are minimal to provide some accountability
to the victims of border patrol abuses; justice is not always defined by the
amount of money that will be won. What may seem like a small amount of
money to remedy violations of civil rights is relative, and this sort of costbenefit analysis demonstrates how we continue to marginalize members of
our communities due to economic status.

V. WAYS THE GOVERNMENT, THE COURTS, LEGAL ADVOCATES,
AND COMMUNITY MEMBERS CAN TAKE ACTION TO DECREASE
CIVIL RIGHTS ABUSES IN BORDER REGIONS
In order to deter abuses and reacquire border community rights, I
recommend that either CBP or Congress eliminate the use of drug-dogs at
interior immigration checkpoints. Removing drug-dogs would help deter
inaccurate and unlawful searches and seizures by the Border Patrol, and
possibly place greater demand on CBP to properly train Border Patrol
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/no-action-taken-lack-cbpaccountability-responding-complaints-abuse.
163
Directory of Pro Bono Programs, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/probono/directory.html# (last visited Mar. 5,
2016).
164
See Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2, 5, 23.
165
Radley Balko, Federal Appeals Court: Drug dog That’s Barely More Accurate than a
Coin Flip is Good Enough, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/08/04/federal-appeals-courtdrug-dog-thats-barely-more-accurate-than-a-coin-flip-is-good-enough/.
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agents on the law if they are unable to be as reliant on drug-dogs. The
following programs could be implemented to help limit civil rights abuses
at the border:
(1) Customs and Border Protection can voluntarily end the Canine
Program within the 100-mile border zone;
(2) Courts can shift their focus towards decisions that protect civil
rights, rather than diminishing them, by recognizing the US
population’s decreased desire to criminalize drugs and the reality
of the immensely intrusive nature of drug-dog sniffs and searches;
(3) Congress can pass a law prohibiting the use of drug-dogs at
interior immigration checkpoints;
(4) The US Government can redefine what “a reasonable distance”
from the border means under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) to scale the
100-mile border zone regulations back and limit the Border
Patrol’s authority;
(5) The US Government can increase funding to legal advocates
primarily in border communities to focus on border civil rights
issues; and
(6) Community members can continue organizing checkpoint
monitoring systems to document the Border Patrol’s activities and
pressure the Border Patrol to comply with the law at immigration
checkpoints.
First, CBP could voluntarily eliminate the Canine Program at internal
immigration checkpoints to align more with the primary permissible source
of

authority

governing

immigration

checkpoints—immigration

enforcement. However, this solution is highly unlikely, given CBP’s goals,
boasting apprehension and unlawful drug interdiction data, and their
annually increasing budget. 166 In the alternative, CBP can take steps to
166

See generally FY 2015 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (July 2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/aboutcontent/fy2015_summary.pdf (highlighting CBP’s budget increases and performance).
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accurately report activities occurring at checkpoints and be more transparent
about that data. For example, CBP can start by disclosing the total number
and location of interior permanent and temporary immigration checkpoints,
including the number of staff and drug-dogs at each checkpoint, and the
hours of operation. As of 2014, CBP failed to report the total number of
checkpoints operating within the 100-mile border zone, only acknowledging
35 permanent checkpoints while maintaining the capacity for 200.167 Legal
services organizations have had to resort to costly and time-consuming
litigation to collect other basic information. 168 A culture of transparency
among the Border Patrol could help foster a culture of trust among residents
in border communities.
Second, courts can play a more active role in restoring the civil rights of
the Fourth Amendment that they have consistently whittled down
throughout case law. No drug exception exists in the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 169 Yet courts have
continued to embrace a lower regard for civil rights closer to the border—
the Supreme Court went as far as authorizing to use of perceived
“Hispanic” race or ethnicity to determine whether reasonable suspicion
exists for the Border Patrol to conduct a roving patrol stop.170
While, dissents from precedential Fourth Amendment cases provide an
extensive summary and critique on how the US Supreme Court has
advocated for the government in the War on Drugs and now the War on
167

Patrol Checkpoints Stir Public Backlash, USA TODAY (June 7, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/07/border-patrol-checkpoints-stirpublic-backlash/10113693/.
168
See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ariz., Residents of Arivaca,
Ariz. Sue Border Patrol Over Right to Protest Checkpoint Operations (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.acluaz.org/issues/press-releases/2014-11/4961.
169
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 31, 47–48 (2000).
170
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975); but see United States
v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that in the Ninth
Circuit, Hispanic appearance is an impermissive factor to rely on to develop a reasonable
suspicion to conduct a stop).
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Terror,171 state courts and state legislators have greater flexibility to be more
protective of individual rights and states. Community members should
organize to advocate for greater rights under state constitutions. For
example, while the US Supreme Court held that pretext stops were
acceptable in Whren v. United States, the Washington State Supreme Court
in State v. Ladson held that pretext stops violated Article I, Section 7 of the
Washington State Constitution.172 State courts and legislators can empower
the community by creating law that protects individual rights rather than
justifying the intrusions of rights by federal agents.
States and circuit courts set different standards that govern the rights of
individuals in those jurisdictions against Border Patrol, which may
contribute to the misinformation both on the part of residents and the
Border Patrol about individual rights in those regions. Border communities
could benefit from case law that provides clearer, but more protective, laws.
As Justice Jackson stated in his dissenting opinion in Brinegar v. United
States,
These [Fourth Amendment rights], I protest, are not mere secondclass rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms.
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a
population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror
in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first
and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary
government.173

171

See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567–78 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (providing an extensive list of cases through from 1975–1976 whose holdings
continuously weakened “Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures”).
172
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833 (Wash.
1999).
173
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Courts need to change their reasonableness balancing analysis to account
for (1) the US public’s increasing interest in decriminalization of drugs,174
and (2) the real intrusive and discriminatory nature of drug-dogs at
immigration checkpoints.175
Third, Congress could pass a law prohibiting the use of drug-dogs at
interior immigration checkpoints. As demonstrated by documented
complaints, civil rights violations in border communities due to the use of
drug-dogs exist, but do not receive the media coverage or national
attention.176 Furthermore, many documented civil rights violations suggest
that the Border Patrol is abusing its power at immigration checkpoints to
focus its efforts on unlawful drug interdiction.177 Marijuana is the largest
drug seized at border checkpoints,178 yet it is a drug that is becoming more
commonly accepted for medicinal and recreational purposes across the
nation.179 The increasing legalization of marijuana has even inspired some
local police departments to remove drug-dogs from their police work to
eliminate the possibility of an unlawful search.180 These factors combined
174

See generally DRUG POLICE ALLIANCE, APPROACHES TO DECRIMINALIZING DRUG
USE AND POSSESSION 3–4 (Feb. 10, 2016),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016//Contributions/Civil/DrugPolicyAlliance/
DPA_Fact_Sheet_Approaches_to_Decriminalization_Feb2015_1.pdf; see also Taking
Control: Pathways to Drug Policies that Work, GLOBAL COMM’N ON DRUG POLICY
(Sept. 2014), http://www.gcdpsummary2014.com/#foreword-from-the-chair.
175
See generally Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2–3.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 3; see also Andrew Becker, Four of Five Border Patrol Drug Busts Involve U.S.
Citizens, Records Show, THE CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Mar. 26, 2013),
http://cironline.org/reports/four-five-border-patrol-drug-busts-involve-us-citizensrecords-show-4312; About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL,
http://www.cbp.gov/about (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
178
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2014, 100–01 (2014),
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP_DHS_2014%20PAR_508C.PDF.
179
See, e.g., Chris Boyette & Jacque Wilson, It’s 2015: Is Weed Legal in Your State?,
CNN (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/07/us/recreational-marijuana-laws/.
180
Bailey, supra note 139.
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should persuade elected officials that drug-dogs at immigration checkpoints
are problematic and the elimination of their use within the 100-mile border
zone would help prevent some border civil rights violations.
Because border regions are particularly affected by the use of drug-dogs
at immigration checkpoints, elected officials in those areas could consider
leading the way in a call to action on the civil rights abuses occurring in
their communities. Northern border communities like those in Washington
State may be likelier leaders in the reform on drug-dog use by the Border
Patrol because of their generally progressive culture,181 and greater amount
of legal services they can devote to litigating issues with the Border
Patrol.182 Furthermore, Washington State has legalized the recreational and
medicinal use of marijuana, and because the Border Patrol has expanded
throughout the US since September 11, 2001, parts of Washington State
within the 100-mile border zone are not immune to civil rights violations
caused by drug-dogs and the Border Patrol.183
Fourth, the regulations authorizing the scope and breadth of the 100-mile
border zone can be reexamined and narrowed. Again, the regulations
establishing the 100-mile border zone were created in the 1950s, at a time
when approximately 1,100 Border Patrol agents policed our borders; today,
over 21,000 Border Patrol agents patrol the 100-mile border zone.184 Today,
181

Peter Mountford, Pacific Northwest: Bicycles, Bookshops, Weirdness & Coffee, THE
GUARDIAN (May 24, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/travel/2013/may/25/pacificnorthwest-seattle-oregon-coffee.
182
See, e.g., Settlement Reins in Border Patrol Stops on the Olympic Peninsula, AM. C.L.
UNION (Sept. 24, 2013), https://aclu-wa.org/news/settlement-reins-border-patrol-stopsolympic-peninsula.
183
See generally FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW AND EQUALITY ET. AL.,
TERROR IN TWILIGHT: BORDER PATROL INVOLVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING (Dec. 1,
2013),
http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=kore
matsu_center.
184
8 U.S.C.A. § 1357 (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (a)(2); see also The Constitution in the
100-Mile Border Zone, AM. C.L. UNION, www.aclu.org/constitution-100-mile-borderzone (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
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approximately two-thirds of the US population lives within the jurisdiction
of the Border Patrol.185 The United States has gone through political and
social change since the 1950s, and border communities have increased in
size;186 we are living in different times. Even if the government is not ready
to eliminate drug-dogs from immigration checkpoints, we should at the very
least seriously scale back the 100-mile border zone to prevent various civil
rights abuses.187
Fifth, the US government should increase funding for legal services
organizations to provide an equal and just opportunity to legally advocate
for the civil rights of border communities. Legal resources in border
communities with the greatest amount of Border Patrol agents are severely
underfunded and understaffed. In a nation that values human rights, dignity,
and autonomy, individuals who have suffered injustice at the hands of the
Border Patrol should be heard, and the government should support the work
of legal advocates and the rights of border communities.188 Furthermore, if
advocates receive more support from the government, they may be in a
better position to help share knowledge, such as “know your rights”
trainings, in their communities to prevent future abuses and support
individuals in reporting past and ongoing abuses.

185

Id.; see also Factsheet on Customs and Border Protection’s 100-Mile Zone, AM. C.L.
UNION, http://www.aclu.org/technology- and-liberty/fact-sheet-us-constitution-freezone (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
186
The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone, AM. C.L. UNION,
www.aclu.org/constitution-100-mile-border-zone (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
187
The ACLU proposes that the 100-mile border zone allowing Border Patrol broad
authority should be scaled back to 25-miles. Custom and Border Protection’s (CBP’s)
100-Mile Rule, AM. C.L. UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/13_08_01_aclu_100_mile_cbp_zone_final.
pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
188
See, e.g., Steve O’Ban & Cyrus Habib, Justice For All, Not Only For Those Who Can
Afford It, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 18, 2015),
http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/protecting-the-legal-rights-of-the-poor/.
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Additionally, with more resources, advocates can focus on impact
litigation around civil rights. The administrative complaint data produced
by the ACLU is only a sample of Fourth Amendment violations occurring
in border communities as a result of the use of drug-dogs. Additionally, the
Department of Homeland Security has not taken action to investigate these
abuses.189 Legal advocates could consider filing a class action lawsuit on
behalf of border residents subject to regular checkpoints and ongoing abuse
in their communities. 190 Such litigation could be a vehicle for courts to
uphold individual right sunder the Fourth Amendment.
Sixth, while time and resources are always barriers, border residents can
borrow the community accountability model used at the Arivaca checkpoint
to hold the Border Patrol in their communities accountable. As discussed
above, community members in Arivaca began monitoring the Border Patrol
checkpoint in their area after the Border Patrol was nonresponsive to their
original complaints of traffic disruption, discrimination, harassment, and
lack of transparency. Legal advocates should collaborate with community
members to ensure that community members are equipped with the proper
legal tools to advocate on their own behalf in case the Border Patrol is
resistant, which it has been at Arivaca.191

VI. CONCLUSION: DOGS ARE FRIENDS, NOT FEDERAL AGENTS
This article is limited to the elimination of drug-dogs at checkpoints
within the 100-mile border zone. Legal professionals with power and
privilege should all be contributing to a discussion on Fourth Amendment
189

E-mail from James Lyall, supra note 98.
Bob Ortega, Border Patrol Sued for Harassing at Arivaca Checkpoint, AZCENTRAL
(Nov. 26, 2014),
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2014/11/20/border-patrolaclu-lawsuit-arivaca-checkpoint-harassment/70021978/.
191
Ted Robbins, In Arizona, Citizens Keep Close Eye on Immigration Checkpoint, NPR
(Mar. 29, 2014, 4:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/03/29/296297733/in-arizonacitizens-keep-close-eye-on-immigration-checkpoint.
190
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policy and its impact in border regions. We must be critical of the 100-mile
border zone regulation, which is outdated and never underwent a formal
administrative process, and our search and seizure laws, which in large part
have been defined by the US government’s interest in interdicting
marijuana activities and supporting the “War on Drugs.” Regardless of the
motivation behind creating such sweeping regulations, these laws are
overbroad and ambiguous. They pay little attention to the individuals
residing in these communities, migration patterns, to the authority and lack
of accountability of the Border Patrol, and to other factors such as the
growing public acceptance towards legalizing federally illegal narcotics. 192
Removing drug-dogs from interior checkpoints is one step towards
preventing civil rights violations and demilitarizing the border. While the
Court has carved out broad exceptions to allow the Border Patrol discretion
in checkpoint searches, the Border Patrol should not view these exceptions
as an unlimited grant of authority or an opportunity to trample civil rights.
Furthermore, the government and courts should be more proactive about
protecting the civil rights of the border communities. The government needs
to take accountability for civil rights violations, and courts and legislatures
need to listen to the affected communities.

192

See Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2.
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